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JUVENILE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL-POST
McKEIVER
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania' held a trial by jury
is not constitutionally required in state juvenile court delinquency pro-
ceedings. Balancing a jury trial's attributes against its adverse effects on
the juvenile process, the Court was reluctant to shackle the "juvenile
court's ability to function in a unique manner; ' 2 a manner that concur-
ring Justices White and Brennan found to supplant the traditional safe-
guards served by jury trials in criminal proceedings. Responding to the
criticisms of the juvenile process the Court stated:
In this field, as in so many others, one perhaps learns best by doing. We
are reluctant to disallow the States further to experiment and to seek in
new and different ways the elusive answers to problems of the young, and
we feel that we would be impeding that experimention by imposing the
jury trial. The States, indeed, must go forward. If, in its wisdom, any
State feels the jury trial is desirable in all cases, or in certain kinds, there
appears to be no impediment to its installing a system embracing that
feature. That, however, is the State's privilege and not its obligation.3
(Emphasis added).
The state juvenile codes provide varying bases for a right to a jury
I. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). The case came to the Supreme Court on appeal from the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, Eastern District [In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970)] and was joined
with In re Burrus on certiorari to the Supreme Court of North Carolina [In re Burrus, 275 N.C.
517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969)]. Representing themselves a joinder of cases at the state level, the cases
provided a broad spectrum of fact patterns and charges.
The Pennsylvania case joined cases involving felonies and misdemeanors. Joseph McKeiver, then
16, was charged with robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods after participating with 20 or 30
youths who took 25¢ from three young teenagers. Edward Terry, then age 15, was charged with
assault and battery on a police officer and conspiracy after striking a police officer who broke up
a fight.
The North Carolina case represented a consolidation of approximately 45 cases which resulted
from charges of wilfully impeding traffic during a protest over school plans [singing, shouting,
clapping and playing basketball along the highway]. Another charge was filed against one member
of the group for wilfully making riotous noise and disorderly conduct in a public school. A jury
trial was requested in all the cases and was denied.
2. Id. at 547.
"The imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system would not strengthen greatly,
if at all, the fact finding function, and would, contrarily, provide an attrition of the juvenile
court's assumed ability to function in a unique manner. It would not remedy the defects of
the system. Meager as has been the hoped for advance in the juvenile field, the alternative
would be regressive, would lose what has been gained, and would tend once again to place
the juvenile squarely in the routine of the criminal process."
3. Id.Washington University Open Scholarship
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trial. Generally the right arises in six situations: (1) when the juvenile
has commited a crime outside the scope of the juvenile court's jurisdic-
tion;4 (2) when the criminal court has concurrent jurisdiction over the
juvenile and exercises it;5 (3) when the juvenile court exercises a discre-
tionary power to waive the juvenile to the criminal court; (4) if a right
to a jury trial is provided within the juvenile court proceeding; (5) if a
right to a jury trial is afforded on appeal; or (6) if a right to a jury trial
is afforded in the criminal court after a judge has waived jurisdiction at
the request of the juvenile.
Within these broad categories the right to a jury trial exists in various
forms. Despite apparent language to the contrary, McKeiver may not
foreclose future challenges to state experimentation with the juvenile's
right to a jury trial. Consequently, this note analyzes the statutory provi-
sions a juvenile could utilize should he desire a jury trial6 and the impli-
cations of exercising that choice. The discussion of these implications
focuses on the dispositional provisions a juvenile exposes himself to if
he opts for a jury trial. Finally the note examines the interplay of these
provisions and suggests possible constitutional infirmities remaining
after the McKeiver decision.
II. SURVEY OF JUVENILE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
A. Right to Jury Trial Within Juvenile System
In fifteen of the fifty-one jurisdictions, juveniles have a right to a trial
4. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 957, 1159 (1953) (capital offenses); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 9-3204 (Supp. 1970) (capital crime or crimes punishable by life imprisonment.); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-02(e) (Supp. 1971) (capital crimes); NEv. REV. STAT. § 62.050 (1967) (capital crime); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-280 (Supp. 1969) (capital crimes); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1103 (9)(a) (crimes
punishable by death or life imprisonment); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-3 (1966) (capital crimes);
WYOM. STAT. ANN. § 14-35 (1965) (homicide). See Frey, The Criminal Responsibility of the
Juvenile Murderer 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 113.
5. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-202 (1968) (gives concurrent jurisdiction); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 62.050 (1967) (capital offenses); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-176 (Supp. 1971) (over fourteen and
punishable by death); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-98b, 14-100a (1968).
In Iowa the criminal courts have been given concurrent jurisdiction, IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.62
(1969). In State v. Stueve, 260 Ia. 787, 150 N.W.2d 597 (1967) this statute was construed to give a
criminal court the right to assume jurisdiction. Directly after this the Iowa legislature enacted
§ 232.64, which has been construed to give the juvenile court original handling of all juvenile cases,
Mallory v. Paradise, 173 N.W.2d 264 (Ia. 1969). The juvenile court determines whether a juvenile
will be prosecuted just as ajuvenile court makes a waiver determination.
Several states have provisions that give the juvenile court original jurisdiction. These provisions
give the juvenile court the initial right to determine whether the case should be handled. See, e.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-206-241 (1964).
6. The juvenile has no control over the first two categories mentioned. Since the scope of this
note is limited to how a juvenile might obtain a jury trial if he desires one, only the last four
categories are discussed.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss4/3
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by jury in the juvenile court proceedings. Ten of these jurisdictions
provide jury trial by statute7 and five by judicial mandate.8 In Alaska,
Iowa, New Mexico, Rhode Island and Tennessee, the state courts have
held the due process clause of the federal constitution,9 the state consti-
tution" or both mandate the right to a jury trial. After McKeiver, the
continuing existence of the right to a jury trial seems questionable in
Tennessee where only the federal constitution was relied on. In New
York and Iowa, on the other hand, the effect of McKeiver is uncertain
since the specific constitutional provisions relied on are unclear." In
New Mexico, Rhode Island and Alaska the state, as well as federal,
constitutions were relied on. In these states the state constitutions
should still support the decisions. 12
7. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-2 (1963); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2307 (1967); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 27.3178 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-604.1 (Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § I110 (Supp. 1970); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1 (13)(b) (1971); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 49-5-6 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.25(2) (Supp. 1971); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-108
(1965); see also S.D. CODE tit. 26, § 8-31 (1969) (judge may request a jury). In Oklahoma and
Michigan only six-member juries are provided; in Colorado a six-member or twelve-member jury
may be requested.
8. RLR v. State, - Alaska - 487 P.2d 27 (1971); State ex rel Shaw v. Breon, 244 Iowa
49, 55 N.W. 2d 565 (1962); Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968); In re McCloud, 8
CRIM. L. REP. 2340 (R.I. Fam. Ct. 1970); In re Rindell, 2 CRIM. L. REP. 3121 (Prov. R.I. Fam.
Ct. 1968); Arwood v. State, 463 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. App. 1970).
But compare, New York has found that a jury trial must be provided in Young Adult and Youth-
ful Offender proceedings (ages 16-21). People v. A.C., 27 N.Y.2d 79, 313 N.Y.S.2d 695, 261
N.E.2d 620 (1970); Browne v. Kendall, 62 Misc.2d 196, 308 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Co. Ct. 1970); People
v. Day, 61 Misc.2d 786, 306 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Co. Ct. 1969); Hogan v. Rosenberg, 58 Misc. 2d 585,
296 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Saunders v. Lupiano, 30 App. Div. 2d 803, 292 N.Y.S.2d 44
(App. Div. 1968). These cases have effectively superseded the earlier New York holdings that denied
the right of a jury trial to Young Adults and Youthful Offenders: People v. Anonymous, 56 Misc.
2d 725, 289 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1968); People v. "Y.O. 2404", 57 Misc.2d 30, 291 N.Y.S.2d
510 (Sup. Ct. 1968); People v. K.. 58 Misc. 2d 526, 296 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1968). The New
York Youthful Offender Act has been amended and now youths 16-18 initially receive a criminal
trial. If they are convicted, a Youthful Offender finding can be made after the pre-sentence investi-
gation. This finding vacates the conviction and replaces it with a Youthful Offender finding and
somewhat limits the possible sentence. This shift from pre-trial to post-trial action effectively means
juveniles 16 and over now receive a normal adult trial, N.Y. CRIM. PROC LAWS § 720.25-.25
(McKinney 1971).
9. Arwood v. State, 463 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. App. 1970).
10. RLR v. State, - Alaska - 487 P.2d 27 (1971); Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437
P.2d 716 (1968).
11. State ex rel Shaw v. Breon, 244 Iowa 49, 55 N.W.2d 565 (1952). Juveniles 16-18 years of
age in New York are tried first in the criminal court and after a conviction may receive Youthful
Offender treatment. All would probably receive a jury trial except those who were assured of
Youthful Offender finding and a sentence of no more than six months. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAWS
§§ 720.20-.25 (McKinney 1971).
12. See In re McCloud, 8 CRM. L. REP. 2340 (R.I. Fam. Ct. 1971); In re Rindell, 2 CRIm. L.
REP. 3121 (Prov. R.I. Fain. Ct. 1968). Even in those cases, however, the extent to which the court
is using the Federal Constitution as a standard in interpreting its state's constitution is unclear.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Among the states that provide for jury trials in the juvenile court, only
nine grant the right to every juvenile who comes before them."a Alaska,
Iowa, New Mexico and Rhode Island grant jury trials only to those
juveniles who commit a crime." In Tennessee, jury trials are available
only to juveniles who commit felonies.' 5 In South Dakota, a jury trial is
available to every juvenile if the judge, in his discretion, deems it appro-
priate. 6
Since juveniles in these fifteen jurisdictions receive jury trials within
the juvenile system, they receive the same disposition as others before
the juvenile court. There is no difference in confinement or treatment,
and the consequence of requesting a jury is limited to the formalizing of
the adjudicatory phase of the juvenile proceedings.
B. Right to Jury Trial Outside Juvenile System
Although the other jurisdictions -do not permit a jury trial in the
juvenile court, 7 a juvenile might be able to obtain a jury trial after
appealing an unfavorable decision to another court or after the juvenile
court waives jurisdiction. In three jurisdictions, the juvenile can request
13. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-2 (1963); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2307 (1967); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 27.3178 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-604.1 (Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 1110 (Supp. 1971); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1(13)(b) (Supp. 1971); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 49-5-6 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.25 (2) (Supp. 1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14.
108 (1965).
In pre-1963 juvenile proceedings Colorado afforded the right to a trial by jury only when at least
a misdemeanor had been committed, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-8-2 (1963).
14. RLR v. State, - Alaska _ 487 P.2d 27 (197 1); State ex rel Shaw v. Breon, 244 Iowa
49, 55 N.W.2d 565 (1952), In Iowa, ajury trial is constitutionally compelled if the only issue is
the commission of a crime. If there are issues pertaining to general delinquency and the crime is
just evidence of that delinquency, the jury trial may not be compelled; Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M.
717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968); In re McCloud, 8 CRIM. L. REP. 2340 (R.I. Fain. Ct. 1971); In re Rindel,
2 CRIM. L. REP. 3121 (R.I. Fain. Ct. 1968).
15. Arwood v. State, 463 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970).
16. S.D. CODE tit. 26, § 8-31 (Supp. 1971).
17. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 354 (1958) (hearing before ajudge); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080 (1970)
(without a jury); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-231 (Supp. 1970) (before a judge or referee); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 45.202.1-.202.2 (Supp. 1969) (referee or judge); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS §§ 553, 558,
560, 680 (Deering, 1969) (referee or judge); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-67 (1968) (before ajudge,
informal with the public excluded); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1175 (Supp. 1968) (without a jury);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.09 (1961) (without a jury); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2420 (1971) (without a
jury); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 571-41 (1968) (without a jury); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1707 (Supp.
1971) (without a jury); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-20 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971) (proceedings
not to be adversary); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3215 (BURNS SUPP. 1970) court makes findings); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-832 (1963) (before judge as if before justice of peace for misdemeanor); Ky. REV,
STAT. ANN. § 209.060 (1970) (without a jury); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1579 (1968) (without a
jury); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 83 (Supp. 1971) (without a jury); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119,
§§ 54-58 (1965) (court will make findings); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155 (1971) (without a jury);
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss4/3
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a jury trial when he appeals to the circuit or superior court following
an unfavorable decision in the juvenile court.'8
In Massachusetts the superior court assumes original jurisdiction over
the proceeding 9 just as if the case had originated there. In Delaware and
Kentucky, on the other hand, the superior or circuit courts exercise
appellate jurisdiction. 0
If appellate courts exercise original jurisdiction, presumably they
could dispose of the juvenile either as an adult or as a juvenile. The
Massachusetts statute, however, requires Massachusetts superior courts
to utilize juvenile dispositional facilities in these instances. 2' Since the
Delaware and Kentucky courts exercise appellate jurisdiction, their dis-
positional powers should also be derived from the juvenile court; how-
ever, there is no clear statutory limitation as in Massachusetts.2 2
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 7187-08 (Supp. 1971) (without a jury, informal manner); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 211.171 (1962) (proceeding as a court of equity); NEa. REV. STAT. § 42-206.3 (1968) (without a
jury); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.090 (1967) (hearing before a master or the court); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 169.9 (Supp. 1970) (informal hearing); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-35 (1952) (without
a jury); N.C. GEN. STAT. art. § 7A-285 (1969 Supp.) (court makes findings); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-20-24 (Supp. 1971) (without a jury); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Supp. 1969) (without
a juryf; ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.490 (1969) (without a jury); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 297 (1965)
(without a jury); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1095.19 (Supp. 1970) (without a jury); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 55-10-94 (Supp. 1971) (without a jury); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 651 (Supp. 1971) (without a
jury); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-154 (Supp. 1971) (judge will publish rules to regulate proceedings);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.030 (1962) (without a jury).
18. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 988, 989, 1181, 1182 (1953) (If a defendant is given $100 fine
or a month-confinement appeal to a criminal court of general jurisdiction), tit. 10, § 563 (anyone
before superior court may demand and receive a jury trial); Letter to Wash. U.L. Q. Sept. 21, 1971
from Delaware Family court judge indicates that a juvenile probably has a right to a jury trial upon
appeal before the superior court; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.380; see Dryden v. Commonwealth,
435 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1970), indicates trial de novo in circuit court with strong probability for right
to jury; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 56 (1965) (superior court shall have jurisdiction of the case
and a jury trial is available there).
In Arkansas the right to a jury trial may also be available to a juvenile. ARK. STAT. ANN. tit.
45, § 237 (1964) provides for an appeal to the circuit court, see also ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 27,
§ 2007 (1964) (appeals give the court original jurisdiction), ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 2008 (1964)
(trial de novo). However, the circuit court is given jurisdiction of appeals from justices courts,
probate courts, and juvenile courts in title 27 and it appears likely that no jury trial is available
since the predecessor to title 45, § 237, which was title 45, § 208, provided that appeals to this
circuit court would be without a jury.
19. MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 119, § 56 (1965).
20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 541 (1953); Joseph v. Comm., 310 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1958).
21. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 56 (Supp. 1970). Also if there is a jury trial on appeal in the
Arkansas system, the case law would indicate that the superior court must enter a juvenile-type
disposition. Cf. Batesville v. Ball, 100 Ark. 496, 140 S.W. 712 (1911); Wilson v. Hinton, 63 Ark.
145, 38 S.W.2d 338 (1896).
22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 542 (1953) (indicating that the superior court has all powers of
disposition); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 2711 (Supp. 1970); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.380
(1970), but see Joseph v. Comm., 310 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950) indicating juvenile
disposition is available.Washington University Open Scholarship
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In jurisdictions where a jury trial is unavailable within the juvenile
court or on appeal, a juvenile might receive a jury trial if the juvenile
court waives jurisdiction to the criminal court. However, in four of these
states, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is exclusive without any
provision for waiver.3 In thirteen others, the court is without authority
to waive its exclusive jurisdiction for juveniles under a certain age. 24
Including these thirteen, however, there are still thirty jurisdictions
where juvenile-initiated or court-initiated waiver provisions offer some
way to obtain a jury trial.?
In five of these thirty jurisdictions, juveniles (or an interested party)
have a statutory right to request a waiver of jurisdiction to the criminal
court. This right takes various forms. Any child in Florida who commits
an act that would be a crime may request waiver;26 however, only juven-
iles over 13 in Illinois,27 16-17 in New Jersey 2 and 18-21 in Nevada 2 may
do so. In Kansas, any juvenile who commits an act that would be a
felony may request waiver.3 1
These five jurisdictions disagree as to whether the juvenile loses his
right to a juvenile disposition by requesting and receiving waiver of the
juvenile court's jurisdiction. In New Jersey and Nevada, where only
older juveniles may request waiver, the juveniles are treated as adults for
23. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-59 (Supp. 1969); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570 (Supp.
1971); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-206.1 (1968); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT. § 713 (1963).
24. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 364 (1959) (14 yrs. old); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS §§ 603, 707 (Decring
1969) (16 yrs. old); HAWAII REV. LAWS §§ 571-11, 571-22 (Supp. 1970) (16 yrs. old); IDAHO CODE
ANN. §§16-1803, 1806 (Supp. 1971) (16 yrs. old); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3214 (Supp. 1970) (15 yrs.
old); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125 (1970) (14 yrs. old); MIss. CODE ANN. § 7185-03 and § 7185-
15 (1952) (13 years old); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 211.031 and 211.071 (1962) (14 yrs. old); NEv. REv.
STAT. §§ 62.040 and 62.080 (1967) (16 yrs. old); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:4-14, 2A:4-15
(1952) (16 yrs. old); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 260, (1965) (14 yrs. old); VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 633,
635 (1958) (16 yrs. old); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-176 (Supp. 1970) (14 yrs. old). Some states also
limit waiver by specifying certain conduct, see notes 38 & 39 infra.
25. In Tennessee jury trials are provided on a limited basis in the juvenile court. Juveniles not
meeting the criteria for a jury trial might utilize the waiver provisions. Arwood v. State, 463 S.W.2d
943 (Tenn. App. 1970), held a juvenile who commits a felony has a right to a jury trial, but TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-234 (Supp. 1970) is not so limited.
26. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(b)(16) (1967).
27. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(5) (Supp. 1971) (committed act that constitutes a crime).
28. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-15 (1970).
29. NEV. REv. STAT. § 62-060 (1967). Maryland also has a waiver provision for persons over
18, but since it is limited to offenses that could be categorized as "contributing to the delinquency
of a minor", it will not be considered here; MD. CODE ANN. ch. 26, § 70-2(e) (Supp. 1970).
30. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808 (1969). A judge of the Family Court for Kent County, Delaware
has indicated that Delaware is contemplating instituting a procedure identical to the Kansas Proce-
dure. Letter to Wash. U.L.Q. Sept. 16, 1971.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss4/3
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dispositional purposes.31 In Illinois and Kansas, juveniles are sent to
juvenile dispositional facilities.32 In Florida, where there is no age
limitation, juveniles are sent either to prison or to its juvenile disposi-
tional facilities.3
If a juvenile does not have a statutory right to request waiver, some
states place waiver in the discretion of the juvenile court judge. There
are twenty-six states with court-initiated waiver provisions in which a
juvenile might receive a jury trial if he is unable to do so by the
previously discussed processes.3 In these twenty-six jurisdictions there
are four categorical guidelines for determining whether waiver should be
exercised. First, if the juvenile is unamenable to a juvenile disposition
and there is reasonable cause to believe he is delinquent3 or has commit-
ted a crime3 6 six jurisdictions may waive him; secondly, if the juvenile
is unamenable to the juvenile process, has committed a crime, is sane
and waiver would be in his best interests and the best interests of the
community, six jurisdictions authorize waiver;37 thirdly, eight jurisdic-
tions leave waiver to the discretion of the judge if the juvenile has com-
mitted a felony (or sometimes any crime);3 and fourthly, if a juvenile
has committed a felony (or sometimes any crime) and it is in his best
31. N.H. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-15 (1952); NEV. REv. STAT. § 62.060 (1967).
32. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 119-2(e) (Supp. 1971) (provides that a male under 17 and female
under 18 shall be committed to juvenile division of the Department of Correction); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-808 (1967) (provides for remand after judgment to juvenile court for disposition).
33. "Where a juvenile judge. . . waives jurisdiction and certifies a case against a juvenile to a
municipal court or other court which would have jurisdiction if the child were treated as an adult,
the child may be treated as an adult by the court to which his or her case is certified and if a sentence
of imprisonment could be imposed on an adult it could likewise be imposed on such a child."
FLA. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 063-99 (1963).
34. See Appendix, Table 1.
35. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 364 (1959).
36. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS § 707 (Deering, 1969); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1806 (Supp. 1969);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125 (1971); Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.071 (1962); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 62.080 (1967).
37. ARIZ. RULEs Juv. CT. § 14 (1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501 (1971); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.26 (Supp. 1970); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-234 (Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE ch. 26, § 70-16 (Supp. 1971).
38. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-241 (1964) (if the juvenile is over 15 and has committed a felony);
HAWAII REv. LAWS § 571-22 (Supp. 1970) (if juvenile is over 18 and has committed a crime); IND.
STAT. ANN. § 9-3214 (Supp. 1970) (if juvenile is over 15 and is charged with a crime); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 7185-15 (1953) (if any crime is committed); N.H. REv.-STAT. § 169-21 (1967) (if any crime
is committed); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6704 (Supp. 1970) (if the juvenile is over 16 and a crime
has been committed); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-176 (Supp. 1971) (this statute provides that if the
juvenile is over 14 and the offense committed is punishable in the penitentiary, he may be waived
or if the juvenile is a repeater and he has committed a felony, he may be waived.); WASH. REV.
CODE § 13.040.030 (1962) (if any crime has been comitted).
Vol. 1971: 605]
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interest and that of the community, then six jurisdictions authorize
waiver to the criminal court. 31
Since the waiver of jurisdiction in these instances is discretionary, the
question arises whether a juvenile can request to be waived to the crimi-
nal court if he desires a jury trial. Although such a request might be
granted, counsel may find himself in the precarious position of arguing
that his client was unamenable to the juvenile process.
Responses to inquiries to a number of juvenile court judges indicate
that statutes in the first two of the above categories, which contain
provisions such as "unamenable to a juvenile disposition", will not be
construed to waive a juvenile over for criminal prosecution simply be-
cause the juvenile desires a jury trial. A juvenile is waived only if he is
"unamenable"-not because of his request 0
In the third and fourth categories, great discretion is afforded the
judge. Judges from states utilizing the fourth category, in which "the
best interests of the child and community" is a guideline, indicate a
willingness to waive jurisdiction if a request is made for purposes of a
jury trial." Judges from states utilizing the third category, in which the
discretion of the judge is untrammeled, indicate a propensity to read an
39. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2611(2) (1964) (probable cause for grand jury plus dangerous
and menance to safety of community); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-280 (Supp. 1970) (if a felony was
committed); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.533) (Supp. 1969) (motor vehicle offenses); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. I1, § 260 (1965) (if the juvenile is over 14 and the offense is indictable); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1095-12 (Supp. 1970) (any juvenile regardless of offense); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-86 (Supp.
1971) (if the juvenile is over 14 and a felony was committed).
40. Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Mobile, Alabama. Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Family
Court of Jefferson Co., Birmingham, Alabama. Letter of Sept. 24, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from
Judge of the Superior Court of Fairbanks, Alaska. Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from
Judge of Youth Guide Center, San Francisco, California. Letter of Sept. 21, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q.
from Judge of the Juvenile Center of Minneapolis, Minn. Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q.
from Judge of the Juvenile Court of St. Louis, Mo. Interview on Sept. 4, 1971 with Judge Noah
Weinstein of the St. Louis County Juvenile Court. But see Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q.
from Judge of Dist. Juvenile Magistrate of Pocatello, Idaho, where it is indicated that if the
juvenile meets the age and felony requirements of the waiver statute the request by the juvenile may
be determinative.
41. State in the Interest of Valdez, Case No. 206, 820 (District Juvenile Court of the Salt Lake
County, Utah (1969).
"If a juvenile is so intent upon having all of the protections of the adult criminal courts
and all of the constitutional rights accorded therein, it is possible, under Utah Law, 55-10-
86, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, to make a Motion for Certification, providing the juvenile is
over fourteen years of age and has allegedly committed a felonious act, as would be the case
with Valdez and Hurley. If the juvenile court, after full investigation and a hearing found it
would be in the best interest of the child or the public to certify (bind-over) the juvenile to
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"unamenable" provision into the statute and achieve the same result as
in the first two categories;42 this result, however, is not universal.4 3
If discretionary waiver provisions are utilized to obtain a jury trial,
consideration should be given to the possible dispositional consequences.
Discretionary waiver statutes" were enacted for juveniles who could not
benefit by the juvenile process. Once jurisdiction is waived the criminal
court accepts jurisdiction and, if found guilty, the juvenile is sentenced
according to the penal statute which he has violated. Six states, however,
indicate that the criminal courts may have the power to utilize the ju-
venile facilities to dispose of the juvenile. 45
the District Court for trial, it could be done and the full panoply of rights would there be
afforded him, including the right to a jury trial."
In the following letters juvenile judges indicated that statutes containing "the best interest" of
the child and/or public would probably be construed to include waiver for a jury trial. Letter of
Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Juvenile & Dom. Rel. Ct. of Clayton County, Jonesboro,
Georgia. Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Juvenile Judge of Portland, Oregon. The
judge indicated that the incorrigibility or unamenability of the juvenile would also bear on the issue.
Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Third District Juvenile Court of Prove,
Utah. Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.LQ. from Judge of the Second District Juvenile Court
of Salt Lake City, Utah. But see Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L. Q. from Juvenile Judge of
Allentown, Pa. who clearly indicated that a request for waiver would have no influence upon the
exercise of waiver of jurisdiction.
42. Summers v. State, - Ind. - 230 N.E.2d 320 (1967).
"Something more than the mere state of mind of the judge... if the offense has prosecutive
merit in the opinion of the prosecuting attorney . . . or if this offense is part of a repetitive
standard . . . said juvenile may be beyond rehabilitation . . . and it is in the best interests
of the public."
Id. at - 230 N.E.2d at 325. Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of 3rd Cir.
Family Court Hilo, Hawaii; Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Juvenile Court of
Akron, Ohio; Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Juvenile Judge of Tacoma, Washing-
ton; Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court of Richmond, Va.; Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Lake Co.
Juvenile Court, Gary, Indiana; Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of Marion
Co. Juvenile Court Indianapolis, Indiana.
43. Letter of September 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q.. from Judge of the Juvenile Court of the Little
Rock, Arkansas.
44. Occasionally these statutes use the terminology "turn over to the proper offices for trial"
rather than "'waiver of jurisdiction". See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.120 (1962).
45. MISS. CODE ANN. § 7185-19 (1942) (even if the juvenile is certified and convicted the circuit
court may utilize a juvenile disposition); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-21 (1955) ("cases so
certified may be disposed of by the superior court according to the laws of that state relating there-
to without any limitations as to orders required by this chapter"); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-177
(Supp. 1971) (certified juvenile may be disposed of by the criminal court as a juvenile or as a
criminal); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7037 (1958) (if juvenile from 16-21 there is a discretionary
right for a criminal court to utilize the juvenile facilities for disposition); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 13.04.115 (Supp. 1971) ("No court or magistrate shall commit any child under sixteen years of
age to jail or lock-up at police station. . . . When any child shall be confined in an institution to
which adults are sentenced, it shall be unlawful to confine them in the same building .. " Al-
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A second possible consequence to be considered prior to a request for
waiver is the possibility that waiver might be binding on all future offen-
ses, particularly if the waiver is based on a finding of "unamenability"."1
The majority of judges have indicated, however, that each time a juvenile
comes before the court the issue of waiver is reconsidered in total.4"
McKeiver seemingly sanctions this multitude of statutory schemes
under the rubric of "experimentation". The next section seeks to dis-
cover possible limits on state experimentation; limits which, despite ap-
parent language to the contrary, McKeiver does not seem to govern.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Prior to McKeiver, constitutional arguments advocating a juvenile's
right to trial by jury followed two lines of reasoning. Some directly
attacked the lack of jury trial as violative of the sixth amendment applic-
able to the states through the fourteenth.4" Others argued collaterally by
attacking jurisdictional waiver provisions. These arguments centered on
the "impermissible choice" doctrine.4" Basically the proponents of this
view thought asserting one's right to a jury trial was ladened with the
though this provision does not preclude sentencing of a juvenile under 16 as an adult it severely
burdens that ability). The courts of Missouri have the power under §§ 211.191 and 219.160 of the
Criminal Code to dispose of a certified juvenile to ajuvenile institution. Interview with Judge Noah
Weinstein of St. Louis County Juvenile Court.
46. MD. CODE ANN. art. 26, § 70-16 (Supp. 1970) (after a juvenile is waived once, there need
be only a summary review to waive him again). Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from
Juvenile Judge of Tacoma, Washington. Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Clayton County, Jonesboro, Georgia. Letter of Sept.
16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Second District Juvenile Court of Salt Lake City,
Utah. Letter of Sept. 21, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Delaware Family Court. Letter
of Sept. 21, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of Hawaii Family Court.
47. Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Juvenile Court of Little Rock,
Arkansas. Letter of September 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Juvenile Court of
Indianapolis, Indiana. Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Juvenile Court
of Gary, Indiana. Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Hawaii Family
Court. Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Akron, Ohio Juvenile Court.
Letter of Sept. 20, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Salt Lake City, Utah Juvenile Court.
Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Allentown, Pennsylvania Juvenile
Court. Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Portland, Oregon Juvenile
Couirt. Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Rhode Island Juvenile Court.
Letter of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from Judge of the Florida Juvenile Court. But see letter
of Sept. 16, 1971 to Wash. U.L.Q. from another-judge of the Hawaii Family Court indicating a
different result.
48. See, e.g., 403 U.S. at 557-63 (Douglas J., dissenting); see generally, Note, Juveniles and their
Right to a Jury Trial, 15 VILL. L. REV. 972 (1970).
49. See generally United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (procedure which discourages
or burdens a defendant's utilization of his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury is unconstitu-
tional).
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burdens of criminal adjudication and harsher penalties."0 Although
McKeiver has settled the basic issue of whether jury trials are a funda-
mental right in juvenile proceedings, the "impermissible choice" issue
remains unsettled. In order to find an "impermissible choice" for this
discussion, it is first necessary to find a possibility of a jury trial.
In Nieves v. United States,5' a federal court in New York found a
right to a jury trial within the existing statutory framework. The defen-
dant in that case was arrested for violation of the federal marijuana laws.
Following arrest, he was under the jurisdiction of the criminal court. He
could avail himself of the benefits of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency
Act; 52 however, requesting disposition under the Juvenile Act would be
construed as a waiver of the defendant's right to a jury trial. 53 The
juvenile, therefore, was originally outside the juvenile system and at-
tempting to gain access to it. To do so he was forced to waive his right
to a jury. This necessarily meant that by exercising the right in the
criminal system he lost the benefits of the juvenile system, i.e. an "im-
permissible choice". 4
In a similar case the New York state court invalidated a waiver provi-
sion of its Youth Code. The appellate court determined that for juveniles
under 16 a right to a jury trial is "neither constitutionally compelled nor
desirable"; 55 but for juveniles over 16 being tried under the Youthful
Offenders or Young Adults sections of the Criminal Code, a jury trial is
constitutionally compelled.58 The court supported this distinction by not-
ing that Youthful Offender adjudication "had all the essential features
of a conviction. . . .": the retention of records, possibility of commit-
ment (for four years), indictment by Grand Jury, and trial in the crimi-
nal court. 57 Thus the use of a jury in the proceedings would have little
disruptive effect upon the procedure. Additionally, due process required
50. See generally, Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (D.C.N.Y. 1968). Right to a trial
by jury for juveniles founded on the following basis: if the defendant chose to avail himself of the
benefits of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, he would be unable to obtain a trial by jury, but
if he were tried criminally he could have a jury trial. The court saw the same impermissible choice
as in Jackson.
51. Id.
52. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-37 (1964).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1964). ". .. [tihe consent required to be given by the juvenile shall be
given by him in writing. . . . [s]uch consent shall be deemed a waiver of a trial by jury".
54. 280 F. Supp. at 1003-06. (The court reached an alternative holding that, regardless of the
waiver provision, due process mandated a right to a jury trial in the juvenile system).
55. In re D, 27 N.Y.2d 90, 261 N.E.2d 627, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1970).
56. People v. A.C., 27 N.Y.2d 79, 261 N.E.2d 620, 313 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1970).
57. Id. at 85, 261 N.E.2d at 624, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
Vol. 1971: 605]
Washington University Open Scholarship
616 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1971: 605
a trial by jury because of the consequences of the adjudication in these
situations. The New York statute that granted Youthful Offender adju-
dication and disposition only after the juvenile had waived his right to a
jury trial was, therefore, an unconstitutional burden on that right. 8
In both these cases, the juvenile had a right to a jury prior to having
to make a choice. This finding is crucial and its importance is exempli-
fied by the decision of the Illinois court in In re Fucini. 9 The court in
that case also considered the "impermissible choice" issue. The court
disagreed with the Nieves court's decision and determined there was no
right to a jury trial within the juvenile proceedings.6" Although the court
rejected' Nieves, there is a key distinction between the two cases. Under
the Illinois statute the defendant was within the juvenile system and was
requesting waiver to the criminal. The Nieves situation was the reverse
of this. Under the Illinois scheme, the juvenile had no right to a jury at
the time of his decision to waive jurisdiction, i.e. "choice". If anything
was burdened in Fucini, it was the juvenile's right to request waiver.
Although this waiver could ultimately result in a jury trial in the crimi-
nal court, the right that was burdened was statutory rather than consti-
tutional. The "impermissible choice" argument, therefore, loses much
of its force. In this context it must be argued that burdening even a
statutory right is impermissible. This premise lacks judicial support. The
cases that have considered the "impermissible choice" doctrine have
clearly involved constitutional rights.6 McKiever's holding that jury
trials are not required in the juvenile system should settle, therefore,
many conflicts in this area. As demonstrated in Fucini, lack of a right
to a jury trial prior to a request for waiver seriously undercuts the
"impermissible choice" argument.
Another aspect of the "impermissible choice" question warrants dis-
cussion. In Jackson v. United States62 the burden placed on the defen-
dant's choice was the possibility of the death penalty if he chose to be
tried by jury. In the juvenile context, however, the burdens are the rigors
of criminal prosecution and the harshness of adult disposition. It is these
concomitants of the adult system, however, that necessitate the constitu-
tional right to a jury in the first place. It could be argued, therefore, that
in reality there is no burden since the increased risk a juvenile is exposed
58. The New York Youthful Offenders Act has now been significantly amended, see notes 8, 11
supra.
59. 44 lll.2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380 (1970).
60. Id. at 311, 255 N.E.2d at 383 ("[w]e do not perceive the same 'Hobson's choice'..
61. See, e.g., Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (fifth amend.); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385
U.S. 493 (1967) (fifth amend.); see also, 1969 Wash. U.L.Q. 231.
62. See note 49 supra.
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to by requesting a jury is actually offset by the jury once his request is
granted. This analysis indicates another possible constitutional infirm-
ity.
Once a juvenile statute makes some provision for a jury, it must then
meet equal protection standards. Since McKeiver found juvenile jury
trials not to be a fundamental right, the state must only demonstrate a
reasonable basis for its classification of those entitled to a jury trial.6 3
This inquiry must focus on the right to a jury within the juvenile system
as well as a right obtained by going outside the system.
A. Jury Trials Outside the Juvenile System-on Appeal or by Waiver
In determining the reasonableness of classification in this process, the
threshold issue is similar to the "impermissible choice" question. Ob-
taining a jury trial outside the juvenile system is laden with the burdens
of criminal adjudication and harsher penalties. Instead of being an
"impermissible choice" question, however, the question now becomes
the reasonableness of denying a jury in the juvenile system and allowing
it in the criminal. Using a constitutional equation, does: [No Jury] +
[Informal Juvenile Proceedings] + [Individualized Juvenile Disposition]
= [Jury] + [Rigorous Criminal Proceedings] + [Adult Disposition]?
The result of this inquiry is dependent on the extent to which jury trials
offset the burdens attendant to the criminal process.
Juries serve both a factfinding and social function.64 Two concurring
justices in McKeiver thought the unique manner in which the juvenile
court operated supplanted the social function of juries in criminal pro-
ceedings.65 This finding was crucial to their due process inquiry, but it
can also be useful here.
If the protections afforded by a jury serve to offset both the rigors of
the criminal proceedings and the harshness of adult disposition, the
constitutional equation can balance.66 The juvenile receives the same
63. See In re Wilson, 438 Pa. 425, 264 A.2d 614 (1970) (equal protection question raised by
length of possible confinement).
64. Duncan v. United States, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1965); see also Note, Juveniles and Their Right
to a Jury Trial, 15 VILL. L. REv. 972, 981-83 (1970).
65. 403 U.S. at 551-57.
66. 403 U.S. at 552.
"To the extent that the jury is a buffer to the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor in the crimi-
nal law system, the distinctive intake policies and procedures of the juvenile court system to
a great extent obviate this important function of the jury. As for the necessity to guard
against judicial bias, a system achieving blameworthiness and punishment for evil choice is
itself an operative force against prejudice and short-tempered justice." (White, J. con-
curring).
In discussing these jury protections, it is not intended to focus only on situations in which juries
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protections in both systems, and hence there is no unequal treatment, i.e.
no violation of equal protection. If, on the other hand, the focus of jury
trial and juvenile court protections is limited to the adjudication phase,67
the eqiuation does not balance. A juvenile must accept harsher adult
disposition merely to insure equal procedural treatment.
As indicated earlier, this analysis is also useful in any "impermissible
choice" inquiry. It is this same inequality in treatment that is considered
the "burden" in that situation. The extent of this burden also depends
on the scope of jury trial protections. Because of this similarity it is
possible to merge both analyses at this point. In any equal protection
inquiry there must be some reasonable justification for the difference in
treatment. The "impermissible choice" inquiry, on the other hand, fo-
cuses on whether the burden is excessive."8 In both instances, it is neces-
sary to determine who is being subjected to this procedure-and why.
Therefore, an equal protection and possibly an "impermissible choice"
issue might arise in those states that: (1) allow a juvenile to obtain a jury
trial on waiver or appeal, but (2) fail to require juvenile disposition
following the adjudicatory proceedings. 9
Theoretically a juvenile who receives a jury trial after being
involuntarily waived to a criminal court is neither advantaged nor disad-
vantaged as compared with a juvenile in the same jurisdiction who is
kept within the system. The juvenile has been excluded from the juvenile
system because it is no longer beneficial'to him. He receives the right to
a jury trial as a necessary concomitant to a criminal prosecution, not
because he desires it.
There are different consideratons when a juvenile can voluntarily ob-
tain a jury trial by requesting that jurisdiction be waived, or by being
afforded one on appeal. Although the juvenile has knowingly subjected
determine the sentence. It is intended rather to suggest the concept that if one is subjected to
rigorous criminal proceedings and harsh disposition, juries serve as a buffer between the state and
the individual. This societal input into the judicial proceedings is necessary to conform to the
"American scheme of justice", Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1965). The extent of the
jury protections for this analysis then must focus on the possible consequences that juries are
intended to serve as a buffer against. Cf. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963).
67. 403 U.S. at 547 & 550. Although Mr. Justice Blackmun does not address himself specifically
to this question, his opinion seems to focus on the adjudicatory phase when discussing juries and
their impact or necessity. Regardless of Mr. Justice Blackmun's opinion, however, this is the argu-
ment one would have to make if he were advocating this position.
68. 390 U.S. at 582.
69. Some of the states that might it this criterion include: Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Ken-
tucky, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Washington. See Appendix, Table
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himself to possible or certain punishment as an adult, this may not
justify the harsh consequences of confinement in a penal institution.
In states where waiver is discretionary, the problem will not arise if
the "best interests" of the child exclude the juvenile's desire for a jury
trial. In those states where a jury trial is available on appeal or manda-
tory on request, the problem is inevitable if the juvenile could be sen-
tenced as an adult. As long as a finding is made that the juvenile can no
longer benefit from the juvenile process, it seems reasonable and proper
to subject him to adult disposition. The reasonableness is more question-
able when the "community's interest" is the governing factor for waiver.
It seems unsupportable when the only element is the juvenile's desire to
be waived or to exercise an appeal, i.e. to obtain a jury trial.
B. Jury Trial Within Juvenile System
As discussed above, when juries are allowed within the juvenile system,
the right is sometimes conditioned on the charges brought."0 An equal
protection claim must therefore focus on whether there is any reasonable
basis for allowing juries for some charges and not others.
Alaska and New Mexico allow jury trials for juveniles who have
committed a crime but do not extend the procedure to delinquents.7 1
Similarly, Tennessee's right to a jury trial is conditioned upon the com-
mission of a felony.72 Arguably the acts committed by a juvenile are
irrelevant to a consideration of his rights to a jury trial. In criminal
prosecutions the Supreme Court has focused on the length of possible
confinement to determine whether a jury trial should be available.73
Here, there is no difference in length of possible confinement for the
juvenile. Usually every juvenile receives the same procedural treatment
and may receive the same disposition regardless of his acts.74 It would
seem that "charges" are inadequate grounds for drawing a reasonable
line to offer a jury trial to some juveniles and not to others.
70. See notes 14 & 15 supra and accompanying text.
71. See note 14 supra.
72. See note 15 supra.
73. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1965).
74. Unlike the criminal system, the disposition selected by the juvenile judge is not statutorally
fitted to specific conduct. Much discretion is left to the judge, see, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 211. 231 (1) (1962) "All commitments made by the juvenile court shall be for an indeterminant
period of time and shall not continue beyond the child's twenty-first birthday."; IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 232.34 (Supp. 1970); but see GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2701 (b) (Supp. 1971) (limits term to 2 years
unless extended after hearing); Standard Juvenile Court Act 24 (N.P.P.A. 1959) (3 years). See also
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 143 (1967) (factors affecting length of confinement).
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Several responses to this argument are possible. First, the legislature
may have thought that juveniles who commit crimes or felonies tend to
be confined for longer periods than others and, by the standards of
Duncan v. Louisiana,75 should receive jury trials. It should be kept in
mind, however, that most juveniles' terms of confinement depend pri-
marily on the juveniles' behavior in the institution, not on what law they
violated. Secondly, juries should only deal with concrete factual determi-
nations. Many of the juvenile crimes are ill-defined and indefinite (e.g.,
growing up in immorality); therefore, the juvenile right to a jury should
be confined to criminal situations. But this response does not pertain to
states where the line is drawn at a felony. Furthermore, many juvenile
offenses are specific enough for a jury (truancy, disobedience), or at least
as specific as some crimes (vagrancy). Thirdly, another reason for draw-
ing the line at crimes may be an attempt to instill sixth amendment
standards in the juvenile system, and concern over the constitutionality
of the state statute if a jury were not provided in these situations.
Despite the possible validity of equal protection arguments, they have
limited usefulness. Although some have a place when arguing for juvenile
disposition or reversal, they clearly do not mandate a far-reaching right
to jury trial for juveniles. Faced with the Court's holding in McKeiver,
it is clear that a state does not have to provide any right to trial by jury
within the juvenile system. 71 If an equal protection claim resulted in the
invalidation of a state juvenile code, an appropriate remedy could be the
denial of jury trials to all juveniles. In addition, in equal protection
arguments arising from waiver or appeal provisions, it is the party
receiving the jury that is the complainant-not the one seeking the jury.77
IV. CONCLUSION
The states as a rule have refused to recognize an overriding impor-
tance in providing a trial by jury within the juvenile system. In structur-
ing the juvenile process to provide safeguards served by juries in criminal
proceedings, the function of the jury has been limited to that of a fact
75. 391 U.S. 145 (1965).
76. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
77. Cf. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U'S. 759
(1970); defendants were faced with same choice as in Jackson but pleaded guilty and thereby waived
their right to a jury rather than go to trial. The Court, however, would not deem the guilty plea
involuntary and affirmed. The impermissible choice questions, therefore, present a spectrum
whereby defendants who exercise their right to jury trial are protected but those who yield to the
burden and plead guilt are not.
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finder. In this context, the adverse effects of imposing trial by jury upon
the juvenile system outweigh its importance as a factfinder. The Supreme
Court in McKeiver sanctioned this theory in the hope of attaining the
goals of the juvenile philosophy.
Although the Court settled most constitutional questions concerning
juvenile jury trials, some equal protection or impermissible choice ques-
'ions may remain. The usefulness of such arguments, however, is limited.
They can afford relief only in collateral areas such as disposition. Any
liberalization of the right of juveniles to a jury trial now seems a question
for the state legislatures-not the courts.
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
















Delaware X See note C J or A
Dist. of Columbia X J




Illinois X [13 and J
Indiana over] X 3
Iowa X [crime] J
Kansas X [felony] J




Mass. X See note C J
Michigan X J
Minn. X I
Miss. X 3 J (poss)
Missouri X I J (poss)
Montana X J
Nebraska None
Nevada X [18-21] X [17 and I A
-under]
New Hamp. X, 3 J (poss)






New Mexico X [crime]
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New York See note D J
North Carolina X 4





Rhode Island X [crime] J
South Carolina X 4
South Dakota X [judge desires] J
Tenn. X [felony] X 2 J
Texas X J
Utah X 4
Vermont X 3 J (poss)
Virginia X 3 J (poss)
Washington X 3 J (poss)
West Virginia X J
Wisc. X J
Wyoming X J
Key: A. Guideline Categories
l.--"unamenable to juvenile process plus reasonable cause to believe delinquent
or committed crime."
2.-"unamenable to juvenile process, committed crime, sane and in best interest of
community."
3.--"discretion of judge if committed a felony (or sometimes a crime)."




2. J (poss)-possible juvenile
3. A-adult
C. The states affording a right to a jury trial on appeal also have discretionary waiver
provisions but they are omitted here. It is assumed in those jurisdictions that the
juvenile would attempt to obtain a jury on appeal rather than through waiver; see
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2711-2713 (1968); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.170
(1969); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 61 (1965).
D. See notes 8 & 11 supra for Youthful Offender provisions.
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